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The Meaning of Life: A Study of the Use of Parole Ineligibility
for Murder Sentencing
Isabel Grant, Crystal Choi, and Debra Parkes
A number of legal developments in recent years suggest that murder sentencing may be becoming increasingly punitive. This study examines two aspects
of setting parole ineligibility for those
convicted of murder. First, using cases
from three two-year time periods spanning the past three decades, the authors
explore whether judicial calculations
of parole ineligibility for second degree
murder have changed over time. Second,
the authors examine changes enacted
in 2011 to allow parole ineligibility to be
imposed consecutively for those who are
convicted of more than one murder.
The study finds a national trend
towards reduced reliance on the minimum ten-year period of parole ineligibility, a slight increase in parole ineligibility
periods over time, and evidence that
increasingly harsh parole ineligibility
in Ontario may be driving the national
trends. With respect to consecutive
periods of parole ineligibility, the cases
suggest that courts are imposing consecutive parole ineligibility in just less
than 45 percent of the eligible cases,
with that result being more likely where
the victims include strangers. Courts in
Ontario and Alberta have thus far shown
the highest rates of consecutive parole
ineligibility, while British Columbia has
largely resisted this trend. The authors conclude that some kind of review
mechanism, like a faint hope clause, is
necessary to temper the harshness of
these increasingly long periods of parole
ineligibility and that further study is

De nombreux avancements juridiques au
cours des dernières années suggèrent
que les peines pour meurtre deviendraient de plus en plus punitives. Cette
étude examine deux aspects de la détermination de l’admissibilité à la libération
conditionnelle des personnes reconnues
coupables de meurtre. Premièrement,
en se penchant sur des causes avancées
au cours de trois périodes de deux ans,
couvrant les trois dernières décennies,
les auteures cherchent à savoir si les
calculs judiciaires concernant l’admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle pour
meurtre au second degré, ont changé
au fil des années. Deuxièmement, les
auteures font l’analyse de modifications
adoptées en 2011 pour permettre l’imposition de périodes consécutives d’inadmissibilité à la libération conditionnelle
pour les personnes ayant commis plus
d’un meurtre.
L’étude révèle que la tendance
nationale est de se fier de moins en
moins à la mise en application de la
période minimale d’inadmissibilité à la
libération conditionnelle de 10 ans, une
légère augmentation de cette période
au fil du temps, et présente des preuves
que la détermination de l’admissibilité à
la libération conditionnelle étant de plus
en plus sévère en Ontario pourrait être
à l’origine des tendances nationales, à la
hausse. En ce qui concerne les périodes
consécutives d’inadmissibilité à la
libération conditionnelle, les causes suggèrent que les tribunaux imposent des
périodes consécutives d’inadmissibilité à
133

warranted to explore the preliminary
trends identified in this study.
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la libération conditionnelle dans un peu
moins de 45 % des causes admissibles,
ce résultat étant plus probable lorsque
la personne coupable ne connaissait pas
les victimes. Les tribunaux de l’Ontario
et de l’Alberta ont jusqu’à présent affiché
les taux les plus élevés de périodes
consécutives d’inadmissibilité à la
libération conditionnelle, tandis que la
Colombie-Britannique a en grande partie
résisté à cette tendance. Les auteures
concluent qu’un processus de révision,
comme la clause de la dernière chance,
est nécessaire afin de tempérer la sévérité des périodes d’inadmissibilité à la
libération conditionnelle de plus en plus
longues et qu’une étude plus approfondie est justifiée pour explorer les
tendances préliminaires identifiées dans
cette étude.
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The Meaning of Life: A Study of the Use of
Parole Ineligibility for Murder Sentencing
Isabel Grant, Crystal Choi, and Debra Parkes*

I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of life sentences as punishment for murder and other
serious crimes is on the rise internationally, and Canada is not immune
to this trend.1 As of 2018, there were 5,619 people serving life or indeterminate sentences in Canada, representing approximately 24 percent of all
individuals under federal correctional supervision in Canada.2 The vast
majority of these people — 4,759 individuals — were serving a mandatory
life sentence for murder.3
Life sentences are remarkable because they result in a form of custodial and, for some, community supervision until the end of a person’s
natural life, leaving little room for redemption, rehabilitation, or hope. For
these reasons, some legal systems do not permit life sentences. Norwegian
*

Isabel Grant, Professor; Crystal Choi, JD Class of 2021; Debra Parkes, Professor and Chair
in Feminist Legal Studies, Peter A. Allard School of Law. The authors would like to thank
Charlotte Baigent, Devin Eeg, and Paul Jon for their research assistance on this paper.
Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers who made a number of helpful suggestions. This
project was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
1 Worldwide, there was an increase of almost 84 percent in the number of people serving
life sentences from 2000 to 2014. See Penal Reform International, Life Imprisonment: A
Policy Briefing (London, UK: Penal Reform International, 2018). See also Nadia Bernaz,
“Life Imprisonment and the Prohibition of Inhuman Punishments in International Human
Rights Law: Moving the Agenda Forward” (2013) 35:2 Hum Rts Q 470.
2 See Public Safety Canada Portfolio Corrections Statistics Committee, Corrections and
Conditional Release: Statistical Overview 2018 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, August 2019)
at 59–60, online (pdf): <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ccrso-2018/ccrso-2018en.pdf> [PSC Committee].
3 Ibid at 60.
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law, for example, has no life sentences,4 and in Portugal life sentences are
unconstitutional.5 Common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom,
the United States, and Canada are generally harsher than their civil law
European counterparts, where determinate sentences are utilized even for
serious offences such as murder.6 The United States leads the world in
meting out life sentences, in many cases without any possibility for parole.7
Research there has shown that the availability of extreme prison sentences
(life without parole or “virtual life” sentences of 50 years or more) has had
an inflationary effect on sentencing generally due to the normalization of
extreme penalties and a magnitude scaling effect, whereby sentences that
might otherwise be seen as unreasonably harsh become accepted.8
Canada has no formal sentence of life without parole; the possibility of
conditional release has always been an essential feature of the post-1976
sentencing regime for murder. Therefore, examining sentencing and parole decisions becomes key to understanding the impact of mandatory life
sentences. What parameters do judges put on a life sentence, and at what
point in their sentence do lifers tend to get released? This paper zeroes in
on the first set of decisions — namely judicial determination of the number
of years a person sentenced to life for murder must serve in prison before
being eligible to apply for parole — and leaves examination of parole board
decision-making for a later paper. While life sentences and relatively long
periods of ineligibility for parole have been normalized in Canadian law,
there are also countervailing principles at stake, such as human dignity,
the salience of hope, and the possibility of rehabilitation, as well as the

4

5

6
7

8

See Hans-Jörg Albrecht, “Post-Adjudication Dispositions in Comparative Perspective”
in Michael Tonry & Richard S Frase, eds, Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 293 at 303.
See Dirk van Zyl Smit, “Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the Brink?”
(2010) 23:1 Federal Sentencing Reporter 39 at 40; Portugal Const (1976, amended 2005) art
XXX §1; Dirk van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton, Life Imprisonment: A Global Human Rights
Analysis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2019) at 18.
van Zyl Smit & Appleton, supra note 5.
As of 2017, there were 206,268 people in the United States (US) serving life sentences or
virtual life sentences of 50 years or more. From 1992 to 2016, the number of Americans
serving life without parole increased by 328 percent to 53,290 individuals. See Ashley
Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences (Washington: Sentencing Project, 2017) at 7, 9, 24, online (pdf): <www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf>.
See Melissa Hamilton, “Extreme Prison Sentences: Legal and Normative Consequences”
(2016) 38:1 Cardozo L Rev 59 at 106–11.
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human and fiscal costs of an aging prison population, which suggest we
should subject these sentences to close scrutiny.9
Since the abolition of the death penalty in 1976, Canada has relied on
mandatory life sentences with long periods of parole ineligibility to punish
persons convicted of murder. The prescribed periods of parole ineligibility have remained consistent since 1976, but a number of related changes have been made to the legislative regime, which have the potential to
make the sentences for murder even harsher. In this study, we examine
what is actually happening in our courts regarding sentencing for murder
to determine whether the sentences imposed by judges have increased
over time. In a subsequent paper, we will be examining how long those
convicted of murder are incarcerated before being released on parole.10
II. CANADA’S MURDER SENTENCING REGIME
The legal regime for murder sentencing has been detailed elsewhere, and
we will only briefly review it here.11 All murder is subject to a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment, and the length of the parole ineligibility
9 See e.g. Derek Spencer, “Hope for Murderers? International Guidance on Interpreting the
Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act” (2017) 22:2
Can Crim L Rev 207; Margaret E Leigey & Doris Schartmueller, “The Fiscal and Human
Costs of Life Without Parole” (2019) 99:2 Prison J 241; Ronald H Aday & Jennifer J Krabill,
“Older and Geriatric Offenders: Critical Issues for the 21st Century” in Lior Gideon, ed,
Special Needs Offenders in Correctional Institutions (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2013) 203.
10 There is no recent publicly available data on this issue. According to the Correctional
Service of Canada, in 1976 the average time in custody for capital and non-capital murder was 15.8 years and 14.6 years, respectively. By 1999, the estimated average time that
someone convicted of first degree murder spent in prison was 28.4 years. These numbers
were calculated using statistical survival analyses to produce an average length of incarceration from the start of the murder sentence to release or death. In other comparable
jurisdictions, the number was much lower: 11 years in New Zealand, 14.4 in England, and
14.8 in Australia. See Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative
Summary of Bill C-48, by Robin MacKay, Publication No 40-3-C48-E, February 2011 revision
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 24 November 2010) at 7, online (pdf ): <lop.parl.ca/
staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/PDF/40-3/
c48-e.pdf>. See also Mark Nafekh & Jillian Flight, A Review and Estimate of Time Spent in
Prison for Offenders Sentenced for Murder (Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, November 2002) at 1, 6, online (pdf): <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/b27-eng.pdf>.
11 See e.g. Julian V Roberts, “Determining Parole Eligibility Dates for Life Prisoners: Lessons from Jury Hearings in Canada” (2002) 4:1 Punishment & Society 103; Isabel Grant,
“Rethinking the Sentencing Regime for Murder” (2001) 39:2/3 Osgoode Hall LJ 655; Micah
B Rankin, “The Origins, Evolution and Puzzling Irrelevance of Jury Recommendations in
Second-Degree Murder Sentencing” (2015) 40:2 Queen’s LJ 531.
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period attached to that sentence depends on whether the murder is classified as first or second degree.12 It is important to stress that these periods of parole ineligibility set the date at which an individual is eligible to
apply for parole, not the date at which they will be paroled. For first degree
murder,13 there is a mandatory period of 25 years before parole eligibility.14 For second degree murder,15 that period is set by the sentencing judge
after a recommendation from the jury, where there is one,16 at somewhere
between ten and 25 years.17 If an individual has already been convicted
of murder, they will be subjected to life imprisonment with 25 years of
parole ineligibility regardless of whether their new conviction is for first
or second degree murder.18 Canada has special rules for persons who are

12 See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 235.
13 First degree murder includes: planned and deliberate murders; murders for hire; murders
of police officers, prison guards and related officials; murders during the course of crimes
such as hijacking, sexual assault, kidnapping, and hostage taking; murders in the course of
criminal harassment; murders while committing an act of terrorism; murders committed
at the direction of a criminal organization; and murders in the course of intimidating a
justice system participant. Ibid, s 231. The original section 214, enacted in 1976, included
only the first four categories; the remaining definitions have been added over time. See
Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 2), 1976, SC 1974-76, c 105 [1976 Amendments].
14 Criminal Code, supra note 12, ss 235(1), 745(a).
15 Second degree murder is defined in the Criminal Code as any murder that is not first degree
murder. Ibid, s 231(7). Before a killing can be labelled as murder, the Crown must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt some form of subjective fault. The Criminal Code outlines when
culpable homicide is murder: it includes intentional murder, a variant of reckless murder,
transferred intent for either intentional or reckless murders, where the wrong person is
killed by mistake, and a form of unlawful object murder, where the accused knows that
death is likely to result from engaging in another form of criminal activity. Ibid, s 229.
16 When present, the jury is told that it may make a recommendation but is not required to
do so. The jury is not given any instruction on how it should come to a recommendation.
A jury recommendation need not be unanimous, and multiple jurors can give different
recommendations. Ibid, s 745.2. A trial judge is not bound by the jury recommendation but
must take it into account. Rankin, supra note 11 at 533. Although murder is almost always
tried by a judge and jury in Canada, there is no equivalent to the jury recommendation
where a judge sits alone in exceptional circumstances or where the accused pleads guilty.
17 Criminal Code, supra note 12, ss 235(1), 745(c). The judge is instructed by the Criminal Code
to consider “the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances
surrounding its commission,” as well as the jury recommendation, if any. Ibid, s 745.4.
18 Ibid, s 745(b).
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sentenced as youth19 and for those sentenced as adults who were under
the age of 18 at the time of the offence.20
In 1976, when this regime was introduced, it was widely considered a
harsh but necessary compromise to win support for abolishing the death
penalty.21 Part of the 1976 compromise was the provision, often referred
to as “the faint hope clause,”22 that gave an individual sentenced to more
than 15 years of parole ineligibility the right to apply to a court after serving 15 years to have that period of parole ineligibility reduced. Under the
original provision, everyone convicted of first degree murder and all those
convicted of second degree murder with parole ineligibility greater than 15
years had access to the faint hope clause, which involved a hearing before
a jury.23 Successful use of the faint hope clause did not inevitably lead to
parole, but rather provided a mechanism for shortening the period before
which an individual was eligible to apply for parole.
As of 2018, a total of 1,740 people serving life sentences were or had
been eligible to apply for reconsideration under the faint hope clause.24
Of the 230 decisions made by juries25 since the first hearing in 1987,26 174
19 For first degree murder, young persons are sentenced to a maximum of ten years, comprised of conditional supervision in the community following a maximum of six years in
custody. For second degree murder, young persons are sentenced to a maximum of seven
years, comprised of conditional supervision in the community following a maximum of
four years in custody. See Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1, s 42(2)(q).
20 Criminal Code, supra note 12, s 745.1 (a person who is under 16 will be sentenced to life with
parole ineligibility for five to seven years; a person who is 16 or 17 and sentenced as an
adult will have a parole ineligibility of ten years for first degree murder and seven years for
second degree murder).
21 See Allan Manson, “The Easy Acceptance of Long Term Confinement in Canada” (1990)
79 CR (3rd) 265.
22 Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 672, as amended by 1976 Amendments, supra note 13.
This was later substantially amended by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (judicial review
of parole ineligibility) and another Act, SC 1996, c 34 [1996 Amendments] and by An Act to
amend the Criminal Code and another Act, SC 2011, c 2 [2011 Amendments].
23 1976 Amendments, supra note 13, s 21.
24 PSC Committee, supra note 2 at 105.
25 Ibid. The document uses the somewhat ambiguous language of judicial review “court decisions,” which we are assuming refers to decisions of a jury empaneled under section
745.61(5) of the Criminal Code, supra note 12, to decide whether the parole ineligibility period
should be reduced, and not to the screening decision of a single judge under section 745.61(1)
as to whether there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed before a jury.
26 Existing death sentences were automatically commuted to a life sentence with a parole
ineligibility period of 25 years. 1976 Amendments, supra note 13, s 25(1). For individuals who
had their death sentences commuted, the time between their arrest and the date of the
commutation counted towards their parole ineligibility period. Ibid, s 21, enacting section
673(b) of the Criminal Code, supra note 12, as it appeared in July, 1978. This may explain
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(76 percent) resulted in a reduced parole ineligibility period. Of those
174 decisions,27 162 (93 percent) resulted in the person’s release by the
parole board at a subsequent hearing. This part of the 1976 compromise
was important because the new regime required long periods of parole
ineligibility, and there was concern that the potential risk those individuals
presented to themselves and to others would only increase if there was
no incentive whatsoever for good behaviour.28 The compromise remained
largely unchanged until the late 1990s, at which time Parliament (under
both Liberal and Conservative governments) began to slowly narrow the
scope of the faint hope clause until its eventual repeal in 2011.29
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a deferential approach to
the constitutionality of murder sentencing. After the proclamation of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms30 in 1982, the Supreme Court used
the Charter to limit the definition of murder. This was not a sentencing
issue but rather a question of which homicides could be labelled murder.
The Court concluded that only homicides with some degree of subjective fault with respect to causing death could be labelled murder.31 The

27

28
29

30
31

the 1987 date of the first faint hope applications despite only 11 years having passed since
the coming into force of the 1976 Amendments.
PSC Committee, supra note 2 at 106. The rate of success of faint hope judicial review applications in Ontario was much lower than it was in the other provinces and territories. Again,
we are assuming that “court decisions” refers to proceedings before a jury empaneled under
section 745.61(5) of the Criminal Code, supra note 12. In all jurisdictions reporting more than
one or two cases, other than Ontario, a substantial majority of the applications resulted in
the jury recommending a reduction. For example, in Quebec, 88 applications were successful and only eight were unsuccessful, whereas in Ontario more than half of the applications
were unsuccessful, with 23 applications granted and 29 denied. In Manitoba, 11 applications resulted in a reduction and only one did not. In Alberta, 19 were successful and eight
unsuccessful, and in British Columbia 23 were successful and six unsuccessful. Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick only had two and one applications, respectively. There were no applications in Prince Edward Island or the Territories. Ibid. It would be an interesting avenue for
future research to investigate what factors might account for this significant disparity.
See House of Commons Debates, 30-1, vol 12 (3 May 1976) at 13091.
1996 Amendments, supra note 22, s 2. In 1996, this provision amended the faint hope provision to require that an applicant satisfy a judge that there was a reasonable prospect that
the application would succeed before a jury would be empaneled to review the case. This
limit was aimed at preventing families from having to deal with a full hearing when there
was almost no chance of success, such as in the case of Clifford Olsen who murdered 11
children in British Columbia and regularly applied for faint hope hearings. See House of
Commons Debates, 35-2, vol 134, No 67 (16 September 1996) at 4217. These amendments
also excluded multiple murders from the faint hope clause.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
See R v Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 SCR 636, 47 DLR (4th) 399 [Vaillancourt cited to SCR]; R v
Martineau, [1990] 2 SCR 633, 109 AR 321 [Martineau cited to SCR].
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Court justified this decision on two grounds: the stigma attached to murder was the primary factor, but the harsh mandatory penalties were also
considered.32
However, when the Court was faced with challenges to the harsh sentence for first degree murder, the narrowed definition of murder was used
to justify upholding this penalty. If only the most blameworthy homicides
could be labelled as murder, Parliament was entitled to attach a correspondingly severe penalty to it.33 The faint hope clause was relied upon to
support the constitutionality of the murder sentencing regime. Twentyfive years of parole ineligibility was less likely to be seen as cruel and
unusual where there was a mechanism that could mitigate its harshness.
As the Court noted in R v Luxton, “[the existence of the faint hope clause]
indicates that even in the cases of our most serious offenders, Parliament
has provided for some sensitivity to the individual circumstances of each
case when it comes to sentencing.”34 The Court of Appeal of Alberta went
so far as to say that whether the mandatory parole ineligibility for the
murder of a police officer was unconstitutional turned on whether 15 years
of parole ineligibility was cruel and unusual punishment, rather than the
full 25 years, demonstrating the importance of the faint hope clause to the
constitutional analysis.35
Several notable changes have been made to this regime since the late
1990s. First, the definition of first degree murder has been expanded
over time to include a wider range of murders, thus potentially shifting
more people into the first degree category. For example, in 1997, Parliament added murders committed pursuant to criminal harassment to the
list of first degree murders.36 The crime of criminal harassment had only
been added to the Criminal Code in 1993, in response to the murders of
two women within a week in Winnipeg by men on restraining orders
32 Vaillancourt, supra note 31 at 653–54.
33 See R v Luxton, [1990] 2 SCR 711, 111 AR 161 [Luxton cited to SCR]. Challenges to second
degree murder sentencing have also been unsuccessful. See R v Latimer, 2001 SCC 1 (Latimer, who had murdered his disabled daughter, unsuccessfully challenged the minimum
sentence for second degree murder as cruel and unusual punishment in his circumstances).
See also R v Mitchell (1987), 81 NSR (2d) 57, 39 CCC (3d) 141 (CA); R v Newborn, 2020 ABCA
120, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39319 (21 January 2021) (upholding the mandatory
minimum sentence for second degree murder).
34 Luxton, supra note 33 at 720.
35 See R v Bowen (1990), 111 AR 146, (sub nom R v Kay) 59 CCC (3d) 515 (Alta CA).
36 See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal harassment
and female genital mutilation), SC 1997, c 16, s 3.
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pertaining to the victims.37 Murders in the course of terrorist activity were
added in 2001, in response to increasing concerns about terrorism after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.38 Some of the new categories
of first degree murder appear to have been enacted in reaction to particularly notorious events, and we have only seen a small number of individuals convicted of first degree murder under the new provisions. In fact,
some of the subsections have no reported cases in which a finding of first
degree murder was made based on the provision.39
Second, Parliament began to narrow the faint hope clause in 1997 and
ultimately prospectively repealed it in 2011.40 Where a murder is committed after December 2, 2011, a person will not have access to a review of
parole ineligibility after 15 years. We have not yet begun to see the effect of
the removal of the faint hope clause because the provision still applies to
those serving a sentence for (single) murders committed before that date.
Third, also in 2011, the Criminal Code was amended to allow those convicted of more than one murder to be given consecutive periods of parole
ineligibility.41 We are now seeing sentences as high as life imprisonment
with 75 years before parole eligibility — a de facto sentence of life without parole.42 Consecutive parole ineligibility is more likely to be used for
37 See Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media
Manipulation and Political Opportunism” (1994) 39:2 McGill LJ 379 at 388–89. See also
Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions: A
Review of the First Ten Years” (2003) 29:1 Queen’s LJ 175.
38 See Anti-Terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41, s 9. See also House of Commons Debates, 37-1, vol 137,
No 95 (16 October 2001) at 6164. Murders committed while intimidating witnesses or
journalists were added in 2001’s An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and
law enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2001, c 32. Murders committed by using explosives in association with a criminal organization were
added in An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal organizations) and to amend other
Acts in consequence, SC 1997, c 23. This was expanded in An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(organized crime and protection of justice system participants), SC 2009, c 22 to include all
murders pursuant to gang activity, regardless of the means of killing.
39 See e.g. Criminal Code, supra note 12, s 231(6.2). We found two cases: R v Cluney, 2008
SKQB 240 (where the Crown failed to prove that Cluney intended to provoke fear in the
victim, which is required by this section) and R v Winmill, 2008 NBCA 88 (where the trial
judge’s flawed instructions prevented the jury from finding Winmill guilty of first degree
murder, resulting in a retrial). We could find no cases of people sentenced under the terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code, supra note 12, s 231(6.01).
40 2011 Amendments, supra note 22.
41 See Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act, SC 2011, c 5,
s 2 [Ending Sentence Discounts Act].
42 The first case involving a parole ineligibility period of 75 years for three first degree
murders was R v Bourque, 2014 NBQB 237 [Bourque]. Prior to Bourque, a 70-year parole
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first degree murders or a combination of first and second degree murders. We have found only three cases where it was imposed for multiple
second degree murders.43 Consecutive parole ineligibility periods have,
with one notable exception,44 survived Charter scrutiny largely because
a judge is never required to impose them; rather, the decision is always
discretionary.45
From 2006 to 2015, the Conservative government charted a more overtly
punitive course in criminal justice policy than had its recent Liberal and
Conservative predecessors.46 The 2011 amendments to the Criminal Code
making consecutive parole ineligibility periods possible and abolishing
the faint hope clause were part of this “punishment agenda,”47 but the
impact of those changes on sentencing outcomes is still largely unknown.

43

44

45

46

47

ineligibility period was imposed in R v Baumgartner, 2013 ABQB 761 [Baumgartner] as the
result of a joint submission by counsel. It could be said that some individuals sentenced
for murder under the pre-2011 regime could have experienced de facto life without parole
(due, for example, to their older age at sentencing or to the unlikelihood that the Parole
Board would release some people convicted of multiple murders). However, in our view,
the new regime produced qualitatively different sentences by building in these extraordinarily long ineligibility periods, even for very young people.
See R v Ostamas, 2016 MBQB 136 [Ostamas]; R v Husbands, [2015] OJ No 2674, 121 WCB
(2d) 487 (Sup Ct) [Husbands]. Note that the verdict in Husbands was eventually overturned,
and Husbands was convicted of manslaughter at a subsequent trial. See R v Husbands, 2017
ONCA 607; “Christopher Husbands Guilty of 2 Counts of Manslaughter in Eaton Centre
Shooting”, CBC News (19 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/
christopher-husbands-verdict-1.5025385>. He received concurrent life sentences for his manslaughter convictions at his subsequent sentencing hearing. See R v Husbands, 2019 ONSC
6824. The third case, R v Bailey, was not reported. See “Alberta Man Who Killed 3 Near
Edson Sentenced to Life Without Parole for 30 Years”, CBC News (21 June 2018), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/mickell-bailey-murder-lyon-berube-miller-1.4717134>
[Bailey].
In Bissonnette c R, 2020 QCCA 1585 [Bissonnette QCCA], the Court of Appeal of Quebec
found section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, which provides for consecutive parole ineligibility, to be unconstitutional. The Crown has sought leave to appeal this decision to the
Supreme Court of Canada. See Kalina Laframboise, “Quebec to Seek Leave to Appeal
Mosque Shooter’s Sentence at Supreme Court”, Global News (15 January 2021), online:
<globalnews.ca/news/7578576/quebec-alexandre-bissonnette-sentence-appeal-supremecourt>.
See R v Husbands, [2015] OJ No 2673, 122 WCB (2d) 21 (Sup Ct); R v Granados-Arana, 2017
ONSC 6785; R v Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299. See also Derek Spencer, “How Multiple Murder
Sentencing Provisions May Violate the Charter” (2019) 55 CR (7th) 165.
See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N Doob, “US Punitiveness ‘Canadian Style’? Cultural Values and Canadian Punishment Policy” (2015) 17:3 Punishment & Society 299;
Anthony N Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, “Weathering the Storm? Testing Long-Standing
Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First Century” (2016) 45 Crime & Justice 359.
See Debra Parkes, “The Punishment Agenda in the Courts” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 589.
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Earlier legislative changes in 1996 that highlighted the seriousness of
male intimate partner violence against women,48 and the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Shropshire interpreting the 1976 second
degree murder sentencing regime,49 may also have had an impact on murder sentencing.
III. OUR STUDY
In this study, we examine the approach Canadian courts have taken to
setting parole ineligibility periods for murder under this legislative regime.
Because the sentence for first degree murder is fixed at life without parole
for 25 years for single murders, one of the few remaining areas of judicial discretion in sentencing for murder is in the setting of the parole
ineligibility attached to second degree murder. We wanted to investigate
whether the punitive changes made to murder sentencing law (allowing
for longer parole ineligibility, consecutive parole ineligibility periods, and
the removal of “faint hope” review) may have had an inflationary effect on
the setting of parole ineligibility periods for murder more generally.
A. Methodology
In the first part of this study, we investigate what has happened since
Shropshire and since the recent changes that have demonstrated an
increasingly harsh approach to sentencing for murder. To examine changes over time, we compiled reported decisions for three two-year time periods over the last three decades. We confined our study to cases involving
the sentencing of adults for second degree murder, thereby excluding all
young people, including those sentenced as adults under the special provisions in section 745.1 of the Criminal Code. Our three time periods were
approximately 15 years apart: 1987–1988, 2002–2003, and 2017–2018. We

48 See Criminal Code, supra note 12, s 718.2(a)(ii), as amended by An Act to amend the Criminal
Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, SC 1995, c 22, s 6 [Act to amend
sentencing] (which made the fact that a victim was one’s spouse or common-law partner a
mandatory aggravating factor).
49 [1995] 4 SCR 227, 129 DLR (4th) 657 [Shropshire cited to SCR]. See also Isabel Grant,
“Intimate Femicide: A Study of Sentencing Trends for Men Who Kill Their Intimate Partners” (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 779 [Grant, “Intimate Femicide”] (for a discussion of the
impact of Shropshire and section 718.2(a)(ii) on sentencing for intimate femicide).
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wanted to have one period that was before the 1995 decision in Shropshire,
one before consecutive sentences were introduced, and one after consecutive sentences were introduced, to investigate whether any of these
changes were followed by changes in parole ineligibility determinations.
We conducted searches on Quicklaw, Westlaw, and CanLII for all
reported decisions where the sentence for second degree murder was
indicated. We also went through sentencing digests for the selected years.
These searches were supplemented by media searches to provide further
details on some cases. We included reasons for sentence, appeals from
sentence, and appeals from conviction where the sentence imposed was
mentioned on appeal. We recognize that this is an incomplete sample and
only provides a snapshot in time of what our courts have been doing. It
is possible that some cases did not have reasons for sentence, such as
those involving joint recommendations, or that those reasons were not
published, particularly in the early time periods. It is also likely that with
the introduction of online databases, more cases will be available in the
later time period than in the early time periods. These time periods are not
presented as rigid categories; we also included decisions outside of the
time period where the sentence was ultimately changed on appeal after
the years under study. Where a sentence was altered on appeal, it is that
final sentence that is included as the sentence imposed.50 We had a handful of cases involving the sentencing of more than one person. Because
sentencing is an individualized process focusing on the circumstances and
blameworthiness of each person before the court, and because co-accused
often receive different sentences, we treat each person sentenced as a separate case for the purposes of our analysis.
We recognize that studying reported judgments can never paint a complete picture of what is happening in the courts. However, we believe it is
a useful exercise to lay the groundwork for future research by providing a
snapshot of trends that may be emerging. We note also that this methodology has been used by other scholars.51 Thus, while we present our results
50 We included 22 cases where the murder conviction was ultimately overturned for reasons
unrelated to sentence. Because of the limited amount of data available, these cases are
nonetheless instructive as to how judges are imposing parole ineligibility.
51 In the context of murder sentencing specifically, see Craig E Jones & Micah E Rankin,
“Justice as Rounding Error? Evidence of Subconscious Bias in Second Degree Murder Sentences in Canada” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 109. Another example of this methodology
can be seen in Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, “The ‘Statutory Rape’ Myth: A Case Law
Study of Sexual Assaults Against Adolescent Girls” (2019) 31:2 CJWL 266 (where the authors examined roughly 600 reported cases involving sexual assault against teenage girls);
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with some caution, we hope that the trends identified in this paper can be
the subject of more exhaustive future research.
It is important to briefly explain the approach to sentencing generally
taken by courts in Canada. Although the statutory rules and principles
governing sentencing are found in federal law, sentencing has developed
in a uniquely provincial manner. Appellate courts in each province or territory have determined whether that jurisdiction will, for example, use
sentencing ranges or starting points to guide judicial discretion,52 and how
those ranges and starting points should be calculated. Lower courts predominantly rely on jurisprudence and direction from their own appellate
court in sentencing, rather than those from other provinces/territories.
The Supreme Court of Canada hears only a small number of sentence
appeals, and that Court has generally shown deference to trial judges53
and to the localized conditions in a community with respect to a particular
crime.54 Scholars have suggested that in countries such as Canada, where
sentencing processes are largely unstructured and no sentencing guidelines or grids exist, interjurisdictional inconsistencies are more common.55
Given this framework, we thought it was important to examine provincial/
territorial trends both when examining parole ineligibility periods and
consecutive parole ineligibility.
In the first part of the paper examining parole ineligibility for second
degree murder, we investigate whether there has been a decrease in reliance on the minimum period of parole ineligibility since the Supreme
Court of Canada provided guidance on this issue in Shropshire; whether
there has been a corresponding increase at the upper end of the range; and
whether the relationship of the person being sentenced to the victim has

52
53

54
55

Helene Love, Fiona Kelly & Israel Doron, “Age and Ageism in Sentencing Practices: Outcomes from a Case Law Review” (2013) 17:2 Can Crim L Rev 253 (where the authors examined 212 sentencing decisions of individuals aged 60 or older between 1981 and 2011). See
also Richard Jochelson, Debao Huang & Melanie J Murchison, “Empiricizing Exclusionary
Remedies — A Cross Canada Study of Exclusion of Evidence Under s 24(2) of the Charter,
Five Years After Grant” (2016) 63:1/2 Crim LQ 206; Michael Nesbitt, “An Empirical Study
of Terrorism Charges and Terrorism Trials in Canada Between September 2001 and September 2018” (2019) 67:1/2 Crim LQ 95.
See R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 36.
Ibid at paras 37–38. See also R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at paras 39–41 [Lacasse]; R v M (CA),
[1996] 1 SCR 500, 105 CCC (3d) 327 [M (CA)]; R v LM, 2008 SCC 31; R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5;
Shropshire, supra note 49.
Lacasse, supra note 53 at paras 87–104; M (CA), supra note 53 at para 92.
Andrew A Reid & David MacAlister, “Extending a Geographical Perspective to the Study of
Jurisdictional Consistency in Sentencing Outcomes” (2018) 58:5 Brit J Crim 1147 at 1165.

The Meaning of Life: A Study of the Use of Parole Ineligibility for Murder Sentencing

an impact on the parole ineligibility period. We also examine whether there
are significant differences in the results among jurisdictions within Canada.
In the second part of the paper, we turn to the use of consecutive
parole ineligibility for multiple murders. We examine whether consecutive parole ineligibility is becoming the norm for those convicted of multiple murders or whether it is only used in exceptional cases; whether
consecutive sentences might be more likely to be imposed for particular
types of murders; and whether there are differences among jurisdictions
in the utilization of consecutive parole ineligibility. Consecutive parole
ineligibility periods are only available for multiple murders that took place
after December 2, 2011. Therefore, we simply do not have enough cases
yet to talk about trends in any meaningful way. However, these early cases
are particularly important and worthy of examination because they set
the doctrinal foundation on which future sentencing judges will decide
whether to impose consecutive parole ineligibility and determine whether
or not it becomes the norm in sentencing multiple murders. What brings
these two parts of the study together is an inquiry into whether, in sentencing for murder, courts have become increasingly punitive and reliant on
extraordinarily long periods of parole ineligibility.
B. Parole Ineligibility Periods for Second Degree Murder
Sentencing
1. Background
It took almost 20 years from the enactment of the 1976 amendments for
the Supreme Court of Canada to provide guidance on setting the parole
ineligibility for second degree murder. Before the Court’s decision in
Shropshire,56 many judges treated ten years of parole ineligibility as the
norm for sentencing second degree murder and required reasons for raising it above the minimum.57 A majority of the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia in Shropshire had indicated that it required unusual circumstances to raise parole ineligibility over ten years and that the deterrent
value of the sentence could be fully realized by a ten-year period of parole
ineligibility.58 The majority of the Court of Appeal noted that the purpose
56 Supra note 49.
57 See e.g. R v O’Connor, 1988 CarswellOnt 37305, WCB 2(d) 374 (Ont CA); R v Leahy, 1978
CarswellOnt 1225, 44 CCC (2d) 479 at 480 (Ont CA); R v Brown (1993), 83 CCC (3d) 394 at
402, 20 WCB (2d) 266 (BCCA).
58 R v Shropshire (1994), 90 CCC (3d) 234 at 239, 24 WCB (2d) 39 (BCCA).
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of the parole ineligibility period was to prevent the parole board from
exercising the very function it was designed to exercise. However, in 1995,
the Supreme Court of Canada in Shropshire instructed judges that raising parole ineligibility over ten years did not require exceptional circumstances. Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Iacobucci said:
In my opinion, a more appropriate standard, which would better reflect
the intentions of Parliament, can be stated in this manner: as a general
rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can
be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before
having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To
this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be
“unusual”, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a
period of 10 years might still be awarded.59

The last sentence of this passage suggests that the Court considered a tenyear parole ineligibility period to be common; it was likely to be ordered
“in the median number of cases” although Justice Iacobucci’s use of the
word “median” is somewhat ambiguous. Shropshire gave judges more latitude to lengthen the parole ineligibility period. The Court further held
that appellate courts should be hesitant to interfere with decisions made
by sentencing judges on parole ineligibility. Leading sentencing scholar
Allan Manson raised the concern at the time that these two findings in
combination would result in higher periods of parole ineligibility with less
scrutiny from appellate courts.60
2. Canadian Parole Ineligibility Decisions Across Time
We examined a total of 296 cases across our three time periods, with each
case representing one person sentenced for second degree murder. Table
1 shows the distribution of cases over each of the three time periods. It
is important to stress that these cases in no way reflect the incidence of
second degree murder at a particular point in time. Rather, we use these
cases to shed light on what courts were doing over time when sentencing
second degree murder.

59 Shropshire, supra note 49 at para 27, Iacobucci J.
60 See Allan Manson, “The Supreme Court Intervenes in Sentencing” (1996) 43 CR (4th) 306.
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Table 1: Case Sample by Time Period
1987–1988
Number of Cases

81 (27.36%)

61

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

85 (28.72%)

130 (43.92%)

296 (100%)

We suspect that the increased number of cases for the most recent
time period is at least in part a function of improved case reporting and
possibly an increased rate of publication of judicial reasons. The homicide rate between 1987–1988 and 2017–2018 declined overall, despite
annual fluctuations.62 We note that these rates are for homicide generally
and not for second degree murder specifically, but there is no reason to
believe that the number of second degree murders has increased more
than those of other homicides, especially given the narrower definition of
murder resulting from the Charter jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
Canada.63
Table 2 presents the average parole ineligibility imposed for each time
period under study. We present these numbers for cases involving one
murder, cases involving multiple murders,64 and all 296 cases respectively.
Except where consecutive parole ineligibility periods are being imposed
(for murders occurring after 2011), someone convicted of more than one
murder is given one global period of parole ineligibility, rather than separate periods for each murder. In other words, the fact that there is more
than one murder aggravates the parole ineligibility in a way that makes
it impossible to disaggregate the sentence for each murder. We expected
that the periods of parole ineligibility for multiple murders would be
higher as a reflection of the additional moral blameworthiness of taking
more than one life. We therefore calculated separate averages for single
and multiple murders.

61 This group of cases includes R v Nepoose (1988), 93 AR 32, 46 CCC (3d) 421 (Alta CA),
which was overturned in R v Nepoose (1992), 125 AR 28, 71 CCC (3d) 419 (Alta CA). This
case is now widely regarded as a wrongful conviction. See Malini Vijaykumar, “A Crisis
of Conscience: Miscarriages of Justice and Indigenous Defendants in Canada” (2018) 51:1
UBC L Rev 161.
62 See Statistics Canada, “Number, Rate, and Percentage Changes in Rates of Homicide Victims” (last modified 25 October 2020), online: Government of Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca/
t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3510006801>.
63 Martineau, supra note 31 at 644–46.
64 Multiple murders consisting of only one second degree murder conviction were counted as
single murders (i.e. only multiple second degree murders were counted as multiple murders).
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Table 2: Average Parole Ineligibility in Years by Number of
Victims, Across Time Periods
Single Murders

1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

13.25 (76)

13.76 (76)

14.07 (125)

13.76 (277)

Multiple Murders

15.00 (5)

15.56 (9)

19.60 (5)

16.47 (19)

All Murders

13.36 (81)

13.95 (85)

14.28 (130)

13.94 (296)

As one would expect, these averages were lower where only single murders were included. For single murders, we saw only a very small increase
in parole ineligibility over the three time periods. The increase in parole ineligibility for multiple murders is based on such a small number of
cases that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the increase in parole
ineligibility over time. Because the number of multiple murders is small,
and because none of these cases involved consecutive parole ineligibility —
but rather were cases where the number of victims was just one factor in
setting parole ineligibility — we have included sentences for both multiple
murders and single murders in our results below, except where we were
investigating the impact on parole ineligibility of the relationship between
the perpetrator and the victim (Tables 4 and 7). For those tables, we have
excluded multiple murders because including them risked overcounting
certain types of victim relationships.
We were also interested in the distribution of sentences across the
15-year range of ten to 25 years parole ineligibility. These results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Distribution of Parole Ineligibility Across Time
Periods (in Five-Year Increments) 65
1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

10-year minimum

35.80% (29)

22.35% (19)

13.08% (17)

21.96% (65)

11–15 years

44.44% (36)

52.94% (45)

60.00% (78)

53.72% (159)

16–20 years

18.52% (15)

22.35% (19)

23.85% (31)

21.96% (65)

21–25 years

1.23% (1)

2.35% (2)

3.08% (4)

2.36% (7)

Total Cases

100.00% (81)

100.00% (85) 100.00% (130)

100.00% (296)

65 Due to rounding, totals may be slightly more or less than 100 percent.
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As we expected, the number of cases receiving the minimum parole
ineligibility was highest in the first time period, before Shropshire. The percentage of cases imposing the minimum periods of parole ineligibility has
gone down consistently over time from a high of approximately 36 percent
in 1987–1988 to a low of approximately 13 percent of cases in 2017–2018.
In all time periods, the largest group of cases fell between 11 and 15
years, inclusive, of parole ineligibility, but there has been a steady increase
(of just over 15 percent) in the percentage of cases in this range over the
three time periods. The following graph demonstrates these findings in a
more visual way.
Figure 1: Distribution of Parole Ineligibility Across
Time Periods (in Five-Year Increments)

We also broke down the parole ineligibility cases by their precise length
of parole ineligibility and found that the most common period of parole
ineligibility imposed in the first two time periods was ten years, whereas
in the later time period the most frequently imposed period was 15 years.
These results are consistent with those of Craig Jones and Micah Rankin, who found that parole ineligibility periods set by the courts tend to
cluster around even numbers and multiples of five, without any obvious
principled reason for such rounding.66 Our findings are demonstrated in
Figure 2.

66 Jones & Rankin, supra note 51.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Parole Ineligibility Periods
Across Time Periods

We also wanted to examine whether different types of murders were
being sentenced differently by courts in terms of the relationship between
the perpetrator and victim. We recognize that there is some arbitrariness in categorizing cases where the relationship does not fit neatly into
one of our categories.67 Some categories, such as intimate partners or
family members, were relatively easy to categorize, while the category of
acquaintances had a wider range of relationships within it. The following table demonstrates that there were some differences in how murders
involving different types of relationships were being sentenced.

67 Where information was unclear in a judgment, we turned to media accounts to glean more
information about some of the relationships in question. Where we were unable to clearly
identify a relationship, the case was categorized as an unknown relationship.
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Table 4: Average Parole Ineligibility Across Time Periods
and Relationship between Victim and Perpetrator,
Canada — Multiple Murders Excluded 68
1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

Intimate
Partners69

11.92 years
(15.79%)70

12.63 years
(21.05%)

14.53 years
(27.20%)

13.53 years (22.74%)
n = 62

Intimate Partners’
Family Members
and New Partners

14.17 years
(7.79%)

12.50 years
(5.26%)

13.80 years
(4.00%)

13.60 years (5.42%)
n = 15

Other Family
Members71

15.20 years
(6.58%)

14.50 years
(7.89%)

13.21 years
(15.20%)

13.80 years (10.83%)
n = 30

Acquaintances72

12.95 years
(28.95%)

14.55 years
(26.32%)

13.54 years
(22.40%)

13.64 years (25.27%)
n = 70

Criminal
Associates73

16.00 years
(6.58%)

15.50 years
(5.26%)

14.68 years
(17.60%)

15.00 years (11.19%)
n = 31

Strangers

13.54 years
(17.11%)

14.11 years
(25.00%)

14.25 years
(12.80%)

14.00 years (17.33%)
n = 48

Relationship
Unknown74

12.46 years
(17.11%)

12.29 years
(9.21%)

15.00 years
(0.80%)

12.52 years (7.22%)
n = 21

Total

13.25 years
(100.00%)
n = 76

13.76 years
(100.00%)
n = 76

14.07 years
(100.00%)
n = 125

13.76 years
(100.00%)
n = 277

Looking first to the overall averages, murders of criminal associates
and strangers received the highest average periods of parole ineligibility of
68 We excluded multiple murders from this table because it was impossible to disaggregate
the parole ineligibility period received for each murder prior to the imposition of consecutive parole ineligibility periods. Nonetheless, of the 19 multiple murders, five involved the
killing of intimate partners and their friends, families, or new partners; four involved the
killing of family members; two involved the killing of acquaintances; two involved the killing of criminal associates; two involved the killing of strangers; and four were unknown.
69 Intimate partners included former intimate partners.
70 Percentages are of cases in each time period.
71 With two exceptions, this category only included family members of the person being
sentenced. These exceptions were R v CAM (1987), 39 CCC (3d) 141, 81 NSR (2d) 57 (CA);
R v Monckton, 2017 ONCA 450. Both of these cases involved men who killed their partner’s
children to whom they were in a parenting role.
72 Acquaintances included friends, neighbours, roommates, and others who had known the
person being sentenced prior to the incident.
73 Criminal associates included those who were connected through drug dealing (including
as rivals), drug debts, as well as murders within a correctional facility.
74 The unknown category included cases where the relationship was not indicated in the case
report, and no further information about the relationship was found in media reports.
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15 years and 14 years, respectively. After excluding unknown relationships,
those who killed intimate partners (13.53 years), intimate partners’ family
members or new partners (13.60 years), and acquaintances (13.64 years)
received the lowest periods of parole ineligibility.
There are also some notable changes over time. For example, there was
an increase in parole ineligibility for the murder of intimate partners over
the three time periods. During the first two time periods, murders of intimate partners generally, received shorter than average parole ineligibility
periods. In contrast, during the most recent time period, the murder of an
intimate partner received longer than average parole ineligibility. Of the
62 intimate partner cases across all time periods, 53 — or approximately 85
percent — involved men killing women and an additional three involved
men killing men (five percent). There were five women who killed male
intimate partners (eight percent) and one woman who killed a female
partner (two percent).
Our findings are consistent with the suggestion that, historically, the
murder of women by their male intimate partners has been treated as less
serious than other murders but that this phenomenon may be changing
over time.75 Since 1995, section 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code76 has
required judges to treat a victim’s status as a spouse or common law partner (and, as of 2019, an intimate partner) of a perpetrator as an aggravating
factor in sentencing.77 Our results are consistent with those of Myrna Dawson, who found an “intimacy discount” in early cases involving intimate
homicides but not in more recent time periods after sentencing reform.78
We also found that murders of strangers consistently received parole
ineligibility periods higher than the average during all three time periods.

75 Grant, “Intimate Femicide”, supra note 49 at 798, 804. See also Isabel Grant, “The Role
of Section 718.2(a)(ii) in Sentencing for Male Intimate Partner Violence Against Women”
(2018) 96:1 Can Bar Rev 158 at 161–63 [Grant, “Intimate Partner Violence”].
76 Act to amend sentencing, supra note 48. This provision was proclaimed into force on 3
September 1996. Note that this provision was recently amended by Bill C-75 to apply to
current and former intimate partners, which are defined as including dating relationships,
and has been extended to apply to “a member of the victim or the offender’s family.” Bill
C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019 (assented to 21 June
2019), SC 2019, c 25, s 293. The amended provision came into force on 19 September 2019,
90 days after royal assent. Ibid, s 406.
77 Grant, “Intimate Partner Violence”, supra note 75 at 160.
78 See Myrna Dawson, “Intimacy, Homicide, and Punishment: Examining Court Outcomes
Over Three Decades” (2012) 45:3 Austl & NZ J Crim 400 at 408.
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We also examined whether sentencing patterns differed depending
on the gender of the victim, given Dawson’s findings of a “female victim
effect” in her review of femicides in Canada.79 Specifically, Dawson found
that the killing of women was treated more punitively throughout the
criminal legal process than that of men. However, Dawson also found an
“intimacy discount,” such that men who killed women with whom they
shared more intimate relationships were subject to less punishment than
those who had more distant relationships with their victims, but that this
had changed over time in how the courts responded to femicide.80
In contrast, in our study, we found no difference in parole ineligibility based on the gender of the victim — 60 percent of whom were men,
regardless of the gender of the perpetrator. While we did not see a difference based on victim gender or a “female victim effect,” we did find an
“intimacy discount” with men’s murders of intimate partners sentenced
less harshly than their murders of other victims in the first two time periods. We also found that, over time, parole ineligibility periods for intimate partner murders increased, paralleling what Dawson observed for all
femicides. Finally, like Dawson, we also found that the murders of strangers were sentenced more harshly than those of intimate partners, family
members, and acquaintances.81
Given the alarming number of Indigenous people serving life sentences — more than a quarter of all people in federal custody on a life or
indeterminate sentence are Indigenous82 — we identified all cases during
the years in question where the decision indicated that the person being
sentenced was Indigenous. We found only 32 decisions out of 296 (11 percent) that made explicit reference to the Indigeneity of the person sentenced. However, these numbers were heavily weighted towards the third
time period. In 1987–1988, Indigeneity was mentioned in just two of 81

79 Myrna Dawson, “Punishing Femicide: Criminal Justice Responses to the Killing of Women
Over Four Decades” (2016) 64:7 Current Sociology 996 at 1009 [Dawson, “Punishing
Femicide”].
80 Ibid.
81 We are not attempting to make direct comparisons to Dawson’s work because she used
very different sources and included all homicides rather than just second degree murders.
She also used much more sophisticated statistical tools than the simple analyses provided
in this paper. We simply note that our findings are consistent with hers in a number of ways.
82 PSC Committee, supra note 2 (“[a]t the end of fiscal year 2017-18, there were a total of
3,672 offenders in custody with a life/indeterminate sentence. Of these … 972 (26.5%) were
Indigenous and 2,700 (73.5%) were non-Indigenous” at 57).
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cases (two percent); in 2002–2003, three of 85 cases (four percent); and
in 2017–2018, the number rose to 27 of 130 cases (21 percent).
One possible explanation for this increase is that, in the earliest time
period, before the enactment of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code,
Indigeneity was considered irrelevant to setting parole ineligibility. Even
after R v Gladue,83 in the second time period, we suspect judges were not
recognizing the applicability of Gladue to parole ineligibility because murder is our most serious crime.84 It was not until the decision in R v Ipeelee,85
where the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that section 718.2(e) and
Gladue apply to all offences, however serious, that judges began to regularly consider Indigeneity in setting parole ineligibility. However, it is
difficult to draw any conclusions about parole ineligibility for Indigenous persons convicted of murder because of our small sample size in the
first two time periods. Whatever the impact of Gladue and Ipeelee, we did
not see Indigenous persons being sentenced to shorter periods of parole
ineligibility than others. In fact, the average parole ineligibility in the final
time period was slightly higher for Indigenous persons (14.33 years) than
for non-Indigenous persons in that time period (14.27 years).
As discussed above, sentencing in Canada is distinctly provincial/territorial in focus. We therefore wanted to compare whether there were any
differences among provinces and territories in setting parole ineligibility.
Table 5: Average Parole Ineligibility in Years by
Province/Territory, Across Time Periods
1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

British Columbia

13.00 (5)

14.07 (15)

13.23 (26)

13.48 (46)

Alberta

13.00 (4)

18.33 (3)

14.00 (2)

15.00 (9)

-

10.00 (1)

14.25 (4)

13.40 (5)

Manitoba

14.40 (5)

10.00 (1)

16.50 (8)

15.29 (14)

Ontario

12.57 (47)

14.21 (34)

15.29 (51)

14.05 (132)

Quebec

13.60 (5)

13.25 (20)

12.95 (20)

13.16 (45)

New Brunswick

17.33 (6)

12.40 (5)

12.83 (6)

13.50 (17)

Nova Scotia

17.75 (4)

15.00 (1)

13.71 (7)

15.17 (12)

Saskatchewan

83 [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385.
84 The first appellate decision to confirm that section 718.2(e) and the Gladue analysis apply
to decisions about parole ineligibility was R v Jensen, [2005] 74 OR (3d) 561 at 28, 195 CCC
(3d) 14 (Ont CA).
85 2012 SCC 13 at paras 84, 87.
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1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

Prince Edward Island

10.00 (1)

-

-

10.00 (1)

Newfoundland and
Labrador

14.00 (1)

17.00 (3)

-

16.25 (4)

Yukon

15.00 (1)

-

11.50 (2)

12.67 (3)

Northwest Territories

10.00 (2)

14.00 (1)

16.00 (2)

13.20 (5)

-

10.00 (1)

14.50 (2)

13.00 (3)

13.36 (81)

13.95 (85)

14.28 (130)

13.94 (296)

Nunavut
Canada

Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the Northwest Territories
showed considerable changes over time. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
both saw declines in parole ineligibility of over four years between 1987–
1988 and 2017–2018, while the Northwest Territories showed an increase of
six years from the first to the last time period, and Manitoba saw an increase
of just over two years. Because these jurisdictions had a small number of
cases, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about these changes.
However, 132 of the total 296 cases (45 percent) were decided in Ontario.
Ontario was of particular interest to us because in 1987–1988, it began
with a lower average parole ineligibility than the national average, but by
2017–2018, had a higher average parole ineligibility than the national average. The finding of an increase in parole ineligibility in Ontario is more
robust than in other provinces given the large number of cases. We thus
decided to examine the Ontario data more carefully to determine whether
Ontario might be an outlier from the rest of the country in setting the
parole ineligibility period.
3. Ontario Parole Ineligibility Decisions Across Time
We found that, unlike the rest of Canada, the average parole ineligibility
period meted out in Ontario increased by 2.72 years — an increase of 22
percent — over the three time periods examined. To explore this further,
we sorted the Ontario cases into the ranges used above, starting with the
minimum parole ineligibility of ten years, and then examined the data in
five-year increments.
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Table 6: Distribution of Parole Ineligibility in Ontario
Across Time Periods (in Five-Year Increments)
1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

10-year minimum

40.43% (19)

17.65% (6)

3.92% (2)

20.45% (27)

11–15 years

48.94% (23)

55.88% (19)

52.94% (27)

52.27% (69)

16–20 years

10.64% (5)

20.59% (7)

39.22% (20)

24.24% (32)

21–25 years

0.00% (0)

5.88% (2)

3.92% (2)

3.03% (4)

Total Cases

100.00% (47)

100.00% (34)

100.00% (51)

100.00% (132)

These ranges can also be illustrated visually to demonstrate how striking the changes in Ontario were. In 1987–1988, a larger percentage of
persons received the ten-year minimum in Ontario (40 percent) than in
Canada as a whole (35 percent). However, by 2017 only about four percent
of people in Ontario received the minimum sentence compared to 13 percent nationally.
Figure 3: Ranges of Parole Ineligibility Periods
Across Time in Ontario

Ontario has seen a substantial decline in individuals being sentenced
to the statutory minimum of ten years of parole ineligibility. The opposite has happened with respect to sentences between 16 and 20 years of
parole ineligibility, which have increased over time. In 1987–1988, only
11 percent of cases in Ontario were being sentenced to 16 to 20 years of
parole ineligibility, compared to 39 percent of cases in 2017–2018. This is

The Meaning of Life: A Study of the Use of Parole Ineligibility for Murder Sentencing

different from the nation-wide trend shown in Figure 2 above, where the
smaller decrease in cases receiving ten years of parole ineligibility corresponded with an increase in cases receiving the intermediate 11 to 15 years,
rather than 16 to 20 years. The differences are more striking when we
compare Ontario in Figure 3 to all Canadian jurisdictions except Ontario
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Ranges of Parole Ineligibility Periods
Across Time in All Jurisdictions Except Ontario

As illustrated by Figure 4, in contrast to Ontario, parole ineligibility
periods of 16 to 20 years actually declined over time in the rest of Canada,
while periods of 11 to 15 years increased. Given these findings and the large
number of cases in Ontario, it is likely that the Ontario cases are largely
responsible for the small increase in the national average parole ineligibility
over time as well as the decline in the imposition of the minimum ten years
of parole ineligibility. There is no indication that any other Canadian jurisdictions are seeing a similar increase except with very small sample sizes.
In an attempt to understand the increasing parole ineligibility seen
in Ontario over time, we examined whether there was a difference in
parole ineligibility based on the relationship between the person being
sentenced and the victim. In other words, were particular murders being
sentenced more harshly and occurring more often in Ontario in the later
time periods? Table 7 presents parole ineligibility based on the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.
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Table 7: Average Parole Ineligibility Across Time Periods
and Relationship Between Victim and Perpetrator in
Ontario — Multiple Murders Excluded 86
1987–1988

2002–2003

2017–2018

All Years

Intimate Partners

12.00 years
(20.00%)

12.14 years
(22.58%)

15.47 years
(30.00%)

13.71 years
(24.60%)
n = 31

Intimate Partners’ Family
Members and Partners

13.00 years
(6.67%)

12.00 years
(3.23%)

14.00 years
(2.00%)

13.00 years
(3.97%)
n=5

Other Family Members

13.33 years
(6.67%)

16.33 years
(9.68%)

15.00 years
(12.00%)

14.92 years
(9.52%)
n = 12

Acquaintances

12.23 years
(28.89%)

12.75 years
(25.81%)

15.40 years
(20.00%)

13.39 years
(24.60%)
n = 31

Criminal Associates

13.33 years
(6.67%)

21.00 years
(6.45%)

14.80 years
(20.00%)

15.33 years
(11.90%)
n = 15

Strangers

13.17 years
(13.33%)

15.14 years
(22.58%)

15.29 years
(14.00%)

14.60 years
(15.87%)
n = 20

Unknown

12.00 years
(17.78%)

13.33 years
(9.68%)

15.00 years
(2.00%)

12.58 years
(9.52%)
n = 12

All Cases

12.47 years
(100.00%)
n = 45

14.06 years
(100.00%)
n = 31

15.20 years
(100.00%)
n = 50

13.94 years
(100.00%)
n = 126

There was an increase in parole ineligibility for every relationship category from 1987–1988 to 2017–2018. Excluding cases where the relationships were unknown, the largest increases were seen in the cases involving
intimate partners, acquaintances, and strangers.
We have several observations about murders involving intimate partners in Ontario. In the first two time periods, the average parole ineligibility for the murder of an intimate partner was lower than the Ontario
86 Six cases were excluded from this table because they had multiple victims, to avoid overcounting them. Two of these cases involved the murder of family members; one case
involved the murder of criminal associates; one case involved the murder of strangers; one
case involved the murder of an intimate partner and her son; and in one case the relationship was unknown.
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average overall. However, the intimate partner category showed the largest increase in parole ineligibility over time. The average parole ineligibility period for intimate partner murders increased by almost 3.5 years
from 1987–1988 to 2017–2018 — an increase of 29 percent. The average
parole ineligibility for killing an intimate partner in Ontario in 2017–2018
(15.47 years) was also higher than the national average for these types of
murders during the same time period (14.53 years). This increase in parole
ineligibility for intimate partner murders was larger in Ontario cases than
in the Canada-wide sample. Of the 31 intimate partner murders over the
three time periods in Ontario, 28 (90 percent) involved men killing their
female partners, while one (three percent) involved a man killing a male
partner. There was one case (three percent) involving a woman killing a
male partner and one (three percent) involving a woman killing a female
partner.
In 1999, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set the range for such murders
between 12 and 15 years in R v McKnight,87 but this range has drifted up to
the point where it now appears to be 12–17 years of parole ineligibility.88 In
2017–2018 in Ontario, there were no cases involving an intimate partner
murder that received the minimum parole ineligibility of ten years.
We also examined whether the gender of the victims had an impact
on the length of parole ineligibility periods. We focused on murders committed by men because of the small number of cases involving women as
perpetrators. In Ontario, 55 percent of victims killed by men were male
(compared to 58 percent for the Canada-wide sample). Overall, men who
killed women or girls in Ontario on average received a slightly longer
parole ineligibility (14.63 years) than those who killed other men or boys
(13.76 years), but the difference was less than one year.
4. Understanding the Numbers
Looking at the national data, we have seen only small increases in average
parole ineligibility periods over the three time periods under study. The
87 [1999] 44 OR (3d) 263 at para 54, 135 CCC (3d).
88 See R v Wristen, [1999] 47 OR (3d) 66 at para 78, 141 CCC (3d) 1 (Ont CA) (where the
Court of Appeal for Ontario refused to interfere with a 17-year ineligibility period for an
intimate partner second degree murder); R v Czibulka, 2011 ONCA 82 (the Court noted
that “[i]n the case before us, the trial judge took Wristen to reflect the upper end of the
range, and I do not see how he can be faulted for doing so. At trial, both Crown and
defence accepted a range of 12 to 17 years” at para 69); R v French, 2017 ONCA 460 (where
the Court stated that Wristen and Czibulka “allow a range up to 17 years in circumstances
where there are no mitigating factors or remorse” at para 31).
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most notable trend nationally is the decrease in the number of people
receiving the minimum of ten years and the increase in people receiving a
sentence in the range of 11–15 years. The direction of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Shropshire that “as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years”89 does not describe what judges were doing in our
sample of cases.
However, when examining Ontario specifically, we found more meaningful increases in parole ineligibility over the three time periods. Ontario
courts in the early time period were more likely to impose the minimum
parole ineligibility than were courts nationally, whereas Ontario courts in
the later time period were less likely than the national average to impose
ten years of parole ineligibility. Thus, Ontario witnessed a dramatic decline
of almost 37 percent in the share of people receiving the minimum parole ineligibility over the three time periods and a corresponding increase
of nearly 29 percent in the number of persons being sentenced to periods from 16 to 20 years. While there was a significant increase in parole
ineligibility for intimate partner murders, this could not explain the entire
increase in Ontario because when we removed intimate partner murders,
we still saw an increase in parole ineligibility over time.
We recognize that it is possible that some of this difference could be a
function of some unidentified reporting biases in Ontario. In other words,
it is possible that cases involving the minimum period of parole ineligibility were less likely to be published or reported in Ontario in the latter
period. It might be possible, for example, that minimum periods of parole
ineligibility are more likely to be the result of a joint recommendation,
which in turn might be less likely to lead to published reasons. However,
there is no reason to believe that Ontario has different reporting biases
than other jurisdictions, and we do not believe that this possibility can
explain the striking differences we found in Ontario compared to the rest
of the country. Further research, with a more comprehensive sample, is
warranted to explore these differences and to determine whether Ontario
has in fact taken an increasingly punitive approach to murder sentencing.

89 Shropshire, supra note 49 at para 27.
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C. Sentencing Multiple Murders Since the Introduction of
Consecutive Parole Ineligibility
The statutory sentencing regime for first degree murder remained the same
between the 1976 changes and the 2011 introduction of consecutive parole
ineligibility. Everyone sentenced for first degree murder was sentenced to
life imprisonment with a mandatory 25 years of parole ineligibility. Until
1997, anyone convicted of first degree murder had access to the faint hope
clause, but it was eliminated for multiple murders as of January 9, 1997.90
In 2011, the Conservative government introduced consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility such that someone sentenced for more than one murder,
committed after that date, could be sentenced to serve periods of parole
ineligibility consecutively.91 The availability of consecutive parole ineligibility for multiple murders applies to both first and second degree murders,
but consecutive parole ineligibility has been imposed most often for first
degree murders and for a combination of first and second degree murders.
Where there is a jury, the jury should be asked for a recommendation as to
whether parole ineligibility should be served consecutively.92 This change
in the law opened up the possibility of parole ineligibility extending significantly beyond the natural life of the person sentenced.
Under these new provisions, a number of Canadians are now serving
effective “whole life” sentences or de facto life without parole, including a
24-year-old man who was sentenced to 75 years of parole ineligibility for
the murder of three police officers.93 These sentences raise serious human
90 1996 Amendments, supra note 22, s 745.6, proclaimed into force 9 January 1997, SI/97-12,
(1997) C Gaz II, 535.
91 Ending Sentence Discounts Act, supra note 41, s 5, proclaimed into force 2 December 2011,
SI/2011-107, (2011) C Gaz II, 2849.
92 Criminal Code, supra note 12, s 745.21. Of the 38 reported multiple murder cases in our sample, jury recommendations were not available in 22 cases due to a guilty plea, a trial before
a judge sitting alone, or a failure to instruct the jury on section 745.21. Of the remaining 16
cases, 12 had divided recommendations, two had unanimous recommendations for consecutive parole ineligibility periods, one had a jury that unanimously declined to make a
recommendation, and one did not mention a jury recommendation.
93 Bourque, supra note 42 at paras 2, 5, 54. See also R v Basil Borutski, 2017 ONSC 7762 at 4, 10
[Borutski] (Borutski received a 70-year ineligibility period at the age of 60); R v Downey,
2019 ABQB 365 at paras 5, 13, 66 [Downey] (Downey received a 50-year ineligibility period
at the age of 49); Ostamas, supra note 43 at para 46 (Ostamas received a 75-year ineligibility
period at the age of 40); R v Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299 at paras 17, 21; and R v Millard, 2018
ONSC 7578 at paras 30, 35 [Millard] (one of the people being sentenced received a 75-year
ineligibility period at the age of 33 and the other received a 50-year ineligibility period at
the age of 30); R v Saretzky, 2017 ABQB 496 at paras 42, 62 [Saretzky] (Saretzky received a
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rights issues that have been addressed in a body of international decisions
focused on the fundamental requirement that a life sentence include some
form of meaningful hope for release.94 Even in the United States — where
more than 200,000 people are serving life sentences, many without any
prospect of release — there are growing calls to abolish these sentences.95
D. Consecutive or Concurrent Parole Ineligibility? The Early Cases
For this part of the study, we compiled a database of all persons for whom
consecutive parole ineligibility was available for first or second degree murder, or some combination thereof. Where more than one person was sentenced for the same multiple murders, we treated these as separate cases.
We found a total of 39 reported cases from December 2, 2011 to August 31,
2020 across Canada.96 We found an additional 15 cases that appeared only
in the news media which clearly stated the length of parole ineligibility
imposed.97 Of the cases reported in official case reporters, consecutive

94
95
96

97

75-year ineligibility period at the age of 24; R v Zekarias, 2018 CarswellOnt 22170, [2018]
OJ No 6827 (Ont Sup Ct) [Zekarias] (Zekarias received a 45-year ineligibility period at the
age of 46); R v Garland, 2017 ABQB 198 at paras 5, 43 [Garland 2017] (Garland received a
75-year ineligibility period at the age of 57). Garland’s appeal from conviction was heard
and dismissed in R v Garland, 2019 ABCA 479. A majority of the Court of Appeal for
Alberta dismissed his appeal from sentence, finding that it was not demonstrably unfit.
See R v Garland, 2021 ABCA 46.
See e.g. Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom [GC], No 66069/09, [2013] III ECHR 317, 63
EHRR 1 [Vinter and Others].
See Marc Mauer & Ashley Nellis, The Meaning of Life: The Case for Abolishing Life Sentences
(New York: The New Press, 2018) at 13.
The data in this section, including in the tables, reflects cases that were decided as of
August 31, 2020. As this article was going to press, the Court of Appeal of Quebec released
its decision in Bissonnette QCCA, supra note 44, on the constitutionality of the consecutive
parole ineligibility regime. We briefly discuss the implications of this case in section III. E.
but we have not updated the statistics or tables to reflect that decision or any other cases
decided after August 31, 2020.
The 15 cases reported only in the media were: Bailey, supra note 43; R v Bear and Bear (2014,
Saskatchewan), as reported in “2 Plead Guilty in Double Murder on Standing Buffalo First
Nation”, CBC News (3 November 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/
2-plead-guilty-in-double-murder-on-standing-buffalo-first-nation-1.2822051> [Bear and
Bear]; R v Eichler (2016, Saskatchewan), as reported in Kevin O’Connor, “No Chance of
Parole for 20 Years for Sask. Man Who Murdered Kelly Goforth, Richele Bear”, CBC News
(20 September 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/clayton-eichlersentenced-for-murders-of-goforth-bear-1.3770181> [Eichler]; R v Hay (2018, Ontario), as
reported in Nick Boivert, “Moka Cafe Shooter Jason Hay Handed Consecutive Life Sentences”, CBC News (4 July 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/moka-cafesentencing-1.4733537> [Hay]; R v Kahsai (2018, Alberta), as reported in Meghan Grant,
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parole ineligibility was imposed in 18 cases (46 percent)98 and concurrent
parole ineligibility was imposed in the other 21 cases (54 percent).99 In the
“No Parole for 50 Years for Double Murderer Emanuel Kahsai Whose ‘Torture’ of Mother
Began a Decade Ago”, CBC News (5 April 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/
emanuel-kahsai-selma-alem-julie-tran-murder-sentencing-1.4606722> [Kahsai]; R v
MacPhail (2020, British Columbia), as reported in Michele Brunoro, “Man Sentenced to
Life in Prison for Killing 2 People During Drug Deal Gone Wrong”, CTV News (23 June
2020), online: <bc.ctvnews.ca/man-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-killing-2-people-duringrug-deal-gone-wrong-1.4997140#:>; R v O’Hagan and Another (2015, Alberta), as reported
in Meaghan Craig, “Convicted Killer Randy O’Hagan Pleads Guilty to 2nd-Degree Murder”,
Global News (2 December 2015), online: <globalnews.ca/news/2375392/convicted-killerrandy-ohagan-pleads-guilty-to-2nd-degree-murder/> [O’Hagan and Another]; R v Pasieka
(2017, Alberta), as reported in Janice Johnston, “Man Who Killed Co-Workers in Edmonton Warehouse Rampage Sentenced to Life in Prison”, CBC News (31 March 2017), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/jayme-pasieka-murder-sentencing-edmontonwarehouse-stabbings-1.4049262> [Pasieka]; R v Rogers (2018, Ontario), as reported in
“Cameron Rogers Pleads Guilty to Killing Parents”, CBC News (19 December 2018), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/cameron-rogers-parent-murder-1.4952085> [Rogers];
R v Ryan (2017, Ontario), as reported in “Brett Ryan Pleads Guilty to Crossbow Deaths of
Mother, 2 Brothers”, CBC News (29 July 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/
brett-ryan-pleads-guilty-1.4227608> [Ryan]; R v Steinhauer (2019, Alberta), as reported in
“Crown Appeals Concurrent Life Terms for Mac’s Killer Colton Steinhauer”, CBC News (4
October 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/crown-appeals-concurrentlife-terms-for-mac-s-killer-colton-steinhauer-1.5308980> [Steinhauer]; R v Vielle (2018,
Alberta), as reported in Meghan Grant, “‘Crimes of Such Horrendous Violence Diminish
Us All,’ Says Judge in Sentencing Triple Murderer”, CBC News (9 January 2018), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/triple-murder-lethbridge-austin-vielle-english-devinesentence-1.4479198> [Vielle]; R v Wettlaufer (2017, Ontario), as reported in Kate Dubinski,
“Ex-Nurse Who Killed 8 Seniors in Her Care Sentenced to 8 Concurrent Life Terms”, CBC
News (23 June 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/killer-nurse-wettlaufersentencing-1.4175164> [Wettlaufer]. In another case, R v Mitchell (2019, Saskatchewan), the
description of parole ineligibility was unclear in the article. This case has therefore been
excluded. See Kendall Latimer, “Man Pleads Guilty to Second-Degree Murder for Regina
Homicide”, CBC News (21 January 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/
malcolm-miles-mitchell-guilty-plea-daniel-richard-dipaolo-1.4987328>.
98 Baumgartner, supra note 42; R c Bissonnette, 2019 QCCS 354 [Bissonnette QCCS]; Borutski,
supra note 93; Bourque, supra note 42; R v Brass, 2018 MBQB 182 [Brass]; R v Clorina, 2015
ABQB 252 [Clorina]; Downey, supra note 93; R v Forman, 2019 BCSC 2165 [Forman]; Garland
2017, supra note 93; R v Granados-Arana, 2018 ONSC 1756 [Granados-Arana 2018]; R c
Hudon-Barbeau, 2018 QCCS 895 [Hudon-Barbeau]; Husbands, supra note 43; Millard, supra
note 93 (his co-accused, Smich, also received consecutive parole ineligibility periods);
Ostamas, supra note 43; Saretzky, supra note 93; R v Vuozzo, 2015 PESC 14 [Vuozzo]; Zekarias,
supra note 93.
99 See R v Addison, 2016 BCSC 2352 [Addison]; R v Bains, 2015 BCSC 2145 [Bains]; R v Berry,
2019 BCSC 2362; R v Delorme, 2019 ABQB 2; R v Guimond, 2020 MBQB 63; R v Howe, 2018
ONSC 3357 [Howe]; R v Kionke, 2018 MBQB 71 [Kionke]; R v Klaus, 2018 ABQB 97 (his
co-accused, Frank, also received concurrent parole ineligibility periods; the Crown has
appealed their sentences); R v Kam, 2020 BCSC 1369; R v Koopmans, 2015 BCSC 2120;
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15 media-reported cases, there were five cases of consecutive parole
ineligibility (33 percent), and ten cases of concurrent parole ineligibility
(67 percent).100 Thus, out of a total of 54 persons eligible for consecutive
parole ineligibility, 23 (43 percent) clearly received consecutive parole
ineligibility and 31 (57 percent) did not. Of the 23 cases receiving consecutive parole ineligibility, three involved charges of second degree murder
only,101 nine involved charges of first degree murder only,102 and 11 involved
a combination of both.103
We examined the positions of the parties in these cases to determine
whether Crown counsel across Canada have consistently sought consecutive parole eligibility or have only done so in certain cases. We assumed that
consecutive parole ineligibility is unlikely to be imposed unless the Crown
was requesting it. We also expected that defence counsel would generally
oppose consecutive parole ineligibility. In presenting the position of the
parties, we limited our consideration to officially-reported cases because
sentencing positions were often unclear in the media-reported cases.
Table 8: Position of Parties in Cases Where Consecutive
Parole Ineligibility Was Imposed
Position Taken on Consecutive Parole Ineligibility

Number of Cases (%)

Parties agreed to consecutive parole ineligibility

5 (27.78%)

Defence opposed consecutive parole ineligibility

13 (72.22%)

Total

18 (100%)

R v Marki, 2018 ONSC 5106; R v McArthur, 2019 ONSC 963 [McArthur]; R v McLeod, 2018
MBQB 73 [McLeod]; R c Ramsurrun, 2017 QCCS 5791; R v Rushton, 2016 NSSC 313 [Rushton];
R v Salehi, 2019 BCSC 698 [Salehi]; R v Sharpe, 2017 MBQB 6; R v Simard, 2019 BCSC 741
[Simard]; R v Sparks MacKinnon, 2019 ONSC 3436; R v Zerbinos, 2019 BCSC 584 [Zerbinos].
100 Consecutive parole ineligibility was imposed in: Bailey, supra note 43; Hay, supra note
97; Kahsai, supra note 97; and O’Hagan and Another, supra note 97. Concurrent parole
ineligibility was imposed in: Bear and Bear, supra note 97; Eichler, supra note 97; MacPhail,
supra note 97; Pasieka, supra note 97; Rogers, supra note 97; Ryan, supra note 97; Steinhauer,
supra note 97; Vielle, supra note 97; and Wettlaufer, supra note 97.
101 Bailey, supra note 43; Husbands, supra note 43; Ostamas, supra note 43.
102 Bissonnette, supra note 98; Bourque, supra note 42; Downey, supra note 93; Garland 2017,
supra note 93; Hay, supra note 97; Kahsai, supra note 97; Millard, supra note 93 (along with
his co-accused, Smich); Saretzky, supra note 93.
103 Baumgartner, supra note 42; Borutski, supra note 93; Brass, supra note 98; Clorina, supra
note 98; Forman, supra note 98; Granados-Arana 2018, supra note 98; Hudon-Barbeau, supra
note 98; O’Hagan and Another, supra note 97; Vuozzo, supra note 98; Zekarias, supra note 93.
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We were surprised to see that in five cases, the defence did not contest
the imposition of consecutive parole ineligibility.104 Most notably, this was
the case in R v Bourque and R v Ostamas, both of which involved parole
ineligibility periods of 75 years. With respect to cases where consecutive
parole ineligibility was not imposed, in half of the cases the Crown had
sought consecutive parole ineligibility, but the judge declined to impose it.
Table 9: Position of Parties in Cases Where Concurrent Parole
Ineligibility Was Imposed
Position Taken on Consecutive Parole Ineligibility

Number of Cases (%)

Crown sought consecutive parole ineligibility

11 (52.38%)

Parties agreed to concurrent parole ineligibility

8 (38.10%)

Unknown

2 (9.52%)105

Total

21 (100%)

Thus, of the 37 reported cases where we know the position taken by the
parties, the Crown sought consecutive parole ineligibility in 29 cases (78
percent). In other words, there were only eight cases (22 percent) where
the Crown did not seek consecutive parole ineligibility.106 Thus, these
cases suggest that the trend is towards Crown counsel seeking consecutive parole ineligibility in multiple murder cases, and that seeking this
extreme option is not limited to exceptional cases.
We also examined whether consecutive parole ineligibility was more
likely to be imposed for particular kinds of murders. It is difficult to draw
direct connections between consecutive parole ineligibility and the relationship to the victim because many of the multiple murders involved victims in different relationships with the perpetrator. For example, a person
104 Baumgartner, supra note 42, Clorina, supra note 98, and Ostamas, supra note 43, were all
the result of joint submissions. The defence in Bourque, supra note 42, conceded 50 years
would be an appropriate parole ineligibility length but did not concede the 75 years ultimately imposed. The accused refused representation in Borutski, supra note 93, and made no
submissions regarding the length of his sentence.
105 In Addison, supra note 99, after being laid off when the mill he worked at closed, Addison
murdered two co-workers and attempted to murder two others. The judge made no mention of consecutive parole ineligibility, although he did state that life sentences could not
be made consecutive to each other. There was no mention of the Crown submission nor
jury recommendation, if any, with respect to consecutive sentences. In Howe, supra note
99, Howe murdered two women with whom he had been in intimate relationships. He
pleaded guilty, and no mention was made of consecutive parole ineligibility.
106 Bains, supra note 99; Kionke, supra note 99; McLeod, supra note 99; Rushton, supra note 99;
Salehi, supra note 99; Simard, supra note 99.
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might murder an intimate partner and a stranger. However, we can say
that 66 percent of murders where victims included strangers resulted in
consecutive parole ineligibility periods, whereas only 36 percent of murders where victims included intimate partners or those connected to
intimate partners (such as a family member or a new partner of a former
intimate partner) received consecutive parole ineligibility. While these
numbers are too small to form the basis for anything more than exploratory findings, they are consistent with Dawson’s concept of an “intimacy
discount,”107 as discussed above.
All but three of the multiple murders in this study were committed
by men.108 We therefore examined whether gender of the victim had any
impact on whether consecutive parole ineligibility was imposed. The same
challenge arose here because some cases involved victims of different genders. We found that murders of men were slightly more likely to result in
consecutive parole ineligibility than those of women. However, the difference was small and could be a function of the high number of consecutive sentences given for the murder of strangers, of whom approximately
80 percent were men, and the lower number of consecutive sentences
given for the murder of intimate partners and those connected to them, of
whom 70 percent were women.
Because of the small number of multiple murder decisions across the
country, it is difficult to compare the rates of imposing consecutive parole
ineligibility across provinces. Nonetheless, it would appear that some preliminary trends can be identified, particularly by comparing provinces with
the most reported multiple murder decisions: British Columbia, Alberta,
and Ontario. Table 10 includes both cases that were officially reported and
those that were only reported in the media, and only includes jurisdictions
from which multiple murder cases are available.

107 Dawson, “Punishing Femicide”, supra note 79 at 1010.
108 There was one reported case, Zerbinos, supra note 99, in which the issue of consecutive
parole ineligibility arose in the context of a woman being sentenced. Zerbinos killed two
women (her mother and, while she awaited trial for her mother’s murder, another incarcerated person) for which she received concurrent ineligibility periods. Media-reported
cases involving women being sentenced included Wettlaufer, supra note 97, and Bear and
Bear, supra note 97 (which involved one woman and one man being sentenced).
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Table 10: Imposition of Consecutive Parole Ineligibility
Periods by Jurisdiction
Number of Multiple
Murder Cases

Number of Cases Imposing
Consecutive Parole Ineligibility

British Columbia

10

1 (10.00%)

Alberta

13

7 (53.85%)

Saskatchewan

5

2 (40.00%)

Manitoba

6

2 (33.33%)

Ontario

14

7 (50.00%)109

Quebec

3

2 (66.67%)

New Brunswick

1

1 (100%)

Nova Scotia

1

0 (0.00%)

PEI

1

1 (100%)

54

23 (42.59%)

Canada Total

British Columbia provides an interesting contrast to Ontario and
Alberta. Judges in British Columbia have only imposed consecutive parole
ineligibility once in ten eligible cases, although the trial judge in that case
avoided a whole-life sentence by combining consecutive with concurrent
sentences and imposing 35 years of parole ineligibility.110 By contrast, in
Ontario and Alberta, at least half of those convicted of multiple murders
received consecutive parole ineligibility.
E. Reconsidering Consecutive Parole Ineligibility
The early case law on consecutive parole ineligibility suggests that, nationally, judges are using this option in approximately 43 percent of the cases
109 One of these cases was Husbands, supra note 43. Husbands shot multiple people in Toronto’s Eaton Centre. After an acquittal, he was convicted of two counts of manslaughter in
2019 and received a life sentence. However, he has been included in this sample since the
acquittal did not involve an error in sentencing.
110 Forman, supra note 98. Forman was convicted of the first degree murders of his two daughters and the second degree murder of his wife. The parole ineligibility for the murders of
his daughters was ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutively to the minimum
ten years of parole ineligibility imposed for the murder of his wife. Had all of the parole
ineligibility been consecutive, the 35-year-old would have been required to serve 60 years
before being eligible for parole. Since this paper went to press, an additional case has been
reported in British Columbia. In R v Brittain, 2020 BCSC 1821, the accused pled guilty to
four counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years of parole ineligibility,
thus continuing British Columbia’s trend of rejecting consecutive parole ineligibility.
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eligible for such sentences with notable differences across jurisdictions.
British Columbia judges have imposed consecutive parole ineligibility in
only one of ten multiple murders, whereas Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta
judges did so in at least half of the cases where consecutive sentences were
available. While the numbers are small, murders related to male intimate
partner violence against women were less likely to receive consecutive
sentences than those involving the murder of strangers.
Consecutive parole ineligibility will result in people serving many more
years in prison in the future, with the resulting human and fiscal costs. It
is difficult to justify these much longer periods of parole ineligibility — de
facto life without parole — on the basis of public safety, as there is no evidence that people convicted of murder have been released on parole to
reoffend in any significant numbers.111 Decision-making by the Parole
Board of Canada is fundamentally risk-averse.112 A number of high-profile
prisoners will never be released.
The financial costs of long parole ineligibility periods amounting to
life without parole are obvious, particularly as these prisoners age in prison.113 However, there are also very substantial human costs of incarcerating people — mostly men — with no realistic hope of ever being released
regardless of whether or not they attempt to turn their lives around while
incarcerated.114 Life sentences with little or no opportunity for parole have
been described in the prison effects literature as a “new and distinctive
kind of ‘prison pain’.”115 People serving life-long sentences devoid of hope
tend to find the deprivations associated with their removal from society to
be more painful than the deprivations inherent within the prisons.116

111 This was recognized by some parliamentarians during the debates pertaining to the Ending
Sentence Discounts Act, supra note 41. See “Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 40-3, No 96 (15
November 2010) at 5959 (André Bellavance).
112 See Ivan Zinger, “Conditional Release and Human Rights in Canada: A Commentary”
(2012) 54:1 Can J Corr 117; Anthony N Doob, Cheryl Marie Webster & Allan Manson,
“Zombie Parole: The Withering of Conditional Release in Canada” (2014) 61:3 Crim LQ 301.
113 See Catherine Appleton & Bent Grøver, “The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole”
(2007) 47:4 Brit J Crim 597 at 611. See also Spencer, supra note 9 at 211–12. See generally, Adelina Iftene, Punished for Aging: Vulnerability, Age, and Access to Justice in Canadian
Penitentiaries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019).
114 Leigey & Schartmueller, supra note 9.
115 See Alison Liebling, “Moral Performance, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Prison
Pain” (2011) 13:5 Punishment & Society 530 at 536.
116 van Zyl Smit & Appleton, supra note 5, ch 7.
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Before the Court of Appeal of Quebec decision in Bissonnette, rendered
late in 2020,117 the Charter challenges to consecutive parole ineligibility
had not engaged fully with the harms resulting from a sentence that precludes any possibility of hope for release. Lisa Kerr and Benjamin Berger
have argued that there are two different types of analysis required under
the cruel and unusual punishment provision of section 12 of the Charter,
depending on whether the case is one challenging the method of the punishment or its severity. Conducting a gross disproportionality analysis as
a severity inquiry, in their view, is destined to fail for consecutive parole
ineligibility because someone who kills more than one person will always
be found to be more morally blameworthy and deserving of a harsher punishment than someone who kills one person. The authors argue, instead,
that consecutive parole ineligibility should be examined from a methods
perspective: “Whether such sentences are proportional or not, the gravamen of the s 12 concern about [consecutive parole ineligibility] is that
there is something intrinsically abhorrent about consigning a person to
die in prison, stripping them of any hope of future liberty.”118
In Bissonnette, the Court of Appeal of Quebec considered the nature of
the punishment itself, finding that a life sentence with a parole ineligibility
period that runs longer than the reasonable life expectancy of the person
serving it, and that leaves no room for rehabilitation or hope of release,
is “degrading because of its absurdity.”119 Imposing consecutive parole
ineligibility also enlists the judiciary in a project of vengeance, a goal that
the Supreme Court of Canada has made clear “has no role to play in a
civilized system of sentencing.”120
The Court in Bissonnette held that the sentences created by section
745.51 are inconsistent with Canada’s international human rights obligations, which require a meaningful opportunity to seek release during a
life sentence.121 The European Court of Human Rights, among others, has
recognized that the salience of hope is more than a practical consideration
that may alleviate some harms of long-term imprisonment. That Court
held that it is a violation of fundamental human dignity to incarcerate
117 Bissonnette QCCA, supra note 44.
118 See Lisa Kerr & Benjamin Berger, “Methods and Severity: The Two Tracks of Section 12”
(2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 235 at para 22 (QL). Kerr and Berger attribute the “seeds of the idea”
of two tracks to the section 12 jurisprudence to Lamer J (as he then was) in R v Smith,
[1987] 1 SCR 1045, 40 DLR (4th) 435.
119 Bissonnette QCCA, supra note 44 at para 93.
120 Ibid at para 94, citing M (CA), supra note 53 at para 80.
121 Bissonnette QCCA, supra note 44 at paras 105–06.
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someone without any chance of release.122 As in Bissonnette, this principle
gives rise to a right to hope for release, not a right to release itself.
In our view, given that all those convicted of murder are subject to
a mandatory life sentence already, there is no public safety or deterrent
justification for consecutive parole ineligibility, which removes all hope
for release — in some cases, for life. Rather, it is a policy that prioritizes
punitiveness for punitiveness’ sake, thus authorizing sentences that are
cruel and unusual. We hope that the Supreme Court of Canada, if it grants
leave to appeal in Bissonnette,123 will recognize that consecutive parole
ineligibility does not serve the interests of public safety and will confirm
that vengeance has no place in Canadian sentencing practice, even for our
most serious crimes.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Our study has identified a number of sentencing patterns for murder that
warrant further research with respect to both the parole ineligibility periods attached to second degree murder and consecutive parole ineligibility
for multiple murders. First, nationally, the average parole ineligibility period for second degree murder increased slightly over time, but the increase
was small. Nevertheless, we did find a dramatic decrease over time in the
number of individuals being sentenced to ten years of parole ineligibility.
The minimum parole ineligibility period of ten years, which was expected
by the Shropshire court to be the norm, has been largely abandoned by sentencing judges in favour of longer periods, especially in Ontario. At least in
our sample of cases, the floor for sentencing murder appears to have been
raised across the country, and especially in Ontario.
Second, the increase in parole ineligibility periods in Ontario may
account for the small change seen nationally. Ontario’s trajectory has
been one of increasing punitiveness, with increasing periods of parole
ineligibility over time across all types of cases. Some — but not all — of
this finding may be a result of an increasing recognition in the Ontario
decisions that the murder of women by their male partners should not be
discounted in sentencing. We believe these findings warrant further study
of parole ineligibility in Ontario to determine whether these results can be
replicated over a larger sample.
122 Vinter and Others, supra note 94.
123 Laframboise, supra note 44.
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Finally, while our numbers are small, the option of consecutive parole ineligibility has been taken up by a number of judges, particularly
those in Ontario and Alberta, while British Columbia courts have so far
largely resisted this option. We worry that once a pattern is established
of imposing consecutive parole ineligibility in a particular jurisdiction, it
will become difficult for judges to return to concurrent parole ineligibility as a baseline that already made Canada’s murder sentencing regime
one of the harshest when compared to those of other liberal democratic
states.124 Given that judges in certain jurisdictions have shown more willingness to utilize consecutive parole ineligibility, we suspect that we will
see the disparity among jurisdictions increase as judges start to rely on
these early cases as setting the baseline for concerns about parity.125 Parity
becomes very challenging when one person convicted of murdering three
people receives 75 years of parole ineligibility and another is sentenced to
25 years. In jurisdictions like Ontario and Alberta, where consecutive parole ineligibility has been used at a higher rate, it may become increasingly
difficult for a judge to impose concurrent parole ineligibility for multiple
murders without creating a perception that the lives of some of the victims
are being devalued, except perhaps where the age of the person being sentenced renders consecutive parole ineligibility effectively meaningless.126
The extent to which these whole life sentences have become a part of
Canadian law, with relatively little examination of their purported justifications, is troubling, and we hope that this preliminary study will prompt
further investigation and reflection on the impact of these sentences on an
individual and societal level. In the meantime, we urge judges to use these
sentences sparingly, with an eye to the dangers of normalizing such extreme
punishments where individuals are denied even the hope of release.
The upward trend in parole ineligibility, particularly in Ontario, and the
introduction of consecutive parole ineligibility makes some sort of review
mechanism, like the faint hope clause, all the more important. At the time
the faint hope clause was amended to exclude multiple murders in 1997,
multiple murders were being sentenced with the same maximum parole
124 See Canada, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary of Bill
S-6, by Robin MacKay, Publication No 40-3-S6-E, April 2011 revision (Ottawa: Library of
Parliament, 30 April 2010) at 7–8, online (pdf): <lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/
Home/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/PDF/40-3/40-3-s6-e.pdf>.
125 See Daniel M Isaacs, “Baseline Framing in Sentencing” (2011) 121:2 Yale LJ 426.
126 In McArthur, supra note 99, McArthur was convicted of murdering eight men. The trial
judge imposed concurrent parole ineligibility largely because McArthur was 66 years of
age when his sentence began and will be 91 after 25 years of parole ineligibility.
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ineligibility as single murders. There was some justification for arguing
that multiple murders should be sentenced more severely than single
murders. Now that there is no maximum parole ineligibility for multiple
murders, which means extraordinarily long periods of parole ineligibility for some individuals, we believe it is important to bring back some
mechanism to reassess these cases after a number of years. We strongly
support bringing back some sort of “faint hope” mechanism that would be
available to all persons convicted of murder, including those convicted of
multiple murders.127 If it is necessary to distinguish multiple murders, the
time required to be served before accessing such a mechanism could be
higher for multiple murders than for single murders.
We also believe that our study demonstrates the need for judges to provide written and published reasons in cases involving sentencing for second
degree murder, and for all multiple murder cases, especially those where
consecutive parole ineligibility is sought. These cases not only provide valuable precedents for future judges but are also necessary tools for researchers to track and understand sentencing for our most serious crime.
At the end of the day, judicial decisions setting parole ineligibility
only tell part of the story of the impact of Canada’s murder sentencing
regime. The question of how long individuals sentenced to life are actually
serving in prison before being released on parole, on average, can only
be answered by examining corrections and parole data, some of which is
not currently in the public realm. We know, for example, that the rate of
withdrawing, postponing, or waiving rights to apply for parole are quite
high, particularly for Indigenous people,128 and that parole decision-making is highly dependent on whether the applicant has the support of correctional authorities for release.129 Further study should be undertaken to
identify the impact of a variety of institutional actors and actions on how
long people sentenced to life are incarcerated before conditional release.
It is only with such data that we can gain a better understanding of the
meaning of life in Canada.
127 Similarly, in their recent call to abolish life sentences in the United States, Mauer and
Nellis recommend that some form of “second look” procedure be instituted in the meantime for those sentenced to life without parole or other long periods of parole ineligibility.
See Mauer & Nellis, supra note 95 at 165.
128 See e.g. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 3 — Preparing Indigenous Offenders
for Release — Correctional Service Canada (Ottawa: OAG, 29 November 2016), online (pdf):
<www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201611_03_e_ 41832.html>.
129 Zinger, supra note 112.

